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The design of new tourism products necessarily enters into the realm of 
uncertainty. Such uncertainty concerns the product developed and its later use as 
much as the way the design project is conducted. It can be linked to events either 
within or outside the firm. It will be considered to be acceptable by the design 
team concerned as long as it remains within a field of tolerance (domain of 
performance, “margin for random effects”, etc.), with the risk relating to how to 
egress from that domain. The first section addresses the issue of uncertainty in 
design and concerns the developed product and its later use just as the way the 
design project is pursued. The second section focuses on decision-making and 
how the various risks that can affect the firm and its environment are taken into 
account.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Today innovation appears to be vital, both for consumers keen on 
new products, and investors ever ready to seek out opportunities and a 
commercial advantage. Innovation is multiform and can concern a 
product or a service just as the organisation offering it. This has been 
covered by many research works, especially addressing the issues of the 
innovative firm, the scientific controversy or the running of industrial 
projects. But works devoted to the emergence of innovation in the design 
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of new tourist-oriented products (Selmi, 2007, 255) are less common. In 
fact, design constitutes the real locus for the emergence of innovation in 
organizations.  
It entails the firm must be able to predict changes in its environment, 
and schedule the actions to be conducted; the innovations considered lead 
to the limits of the current state of knowledge and moreover remain 
sensitive to an uncertain environment
2
 that further exacerbates their 
complexity
3
. This difficult management in uncertainty
4
 is generally 
conducted through various forms of feedback and learning from the past, 
rounded out by individual and/or collective thinking of the players 
concerned who harness their specific knowledge to a social construction 
of knowledge. This ever more sophisticated process implies mobilising a 
host of forms of knowledge and players, both inside and outside the 
firm, who must understand each other and interact to attain a goal of 
collective creation while ensuring control over the associated risks, 
whether they be of a technical (reliability, availability and safety) or 
programmatic (costs and lead-times) nature. Their cooperation proves to 
be all the more crucial in so far as the quantity of information and the 
amount of knowledge to be harnessed increase, the cognitive 
interdependences become frequent, and the organization of the activity 
becomes awkward or even impossible to determine a priori (De Terssac, 
1996). This becomes all the more delicate a matter for designers in so far 
as risk is an eminently subjective notion that takes on board dimensions, 
which themselves are difficult to evaluate. The variegated perception of 
the players involved then has a biasing effect when it comes to taking 
action and tends to interfere with communication, both internally between 
                                                 
2 Besides natural hazards (earthquake, solar eruptions, etc.), such systems 
are also exposed to risks of malice (intrusion, piracy, vandalism, 
terrorism, etc.) or malfunctions of outside resources (information 
technology systems, for example). 
3 Here we shall not develop the various economic, political or social 
pressures likely to weigh on design. 
4 Uncertainty can be defined as the impossibility of describing events that 
have not yet occurred or not accessible to measurement (which 
measurement is itself marred by uncertainty). It can equally concern 
imprecise knowledge of physical phenomena and the value of certain 
parameters, and contingencies, that is the occurrence and amplitude of 
random events whether of a predictable nature or not. It covers the risk 
that can be identifiable and open to evaluation, but also sometimes 
impossible to apprehend. 
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the experts and the decision-makers, and outside the firm when the latter 
attempts to explain and give formal proofs of the uncertain situation to its 
customers and partners in the field of tourism. As a result, the 
management of uncertainty and communication prove to be in 
dissociable. 
The present contribution attempts to come to an understanding of 
both the multiple sides of uncertainty prevalent in the activity of tourism-
products designers and the processes through which the corresponding 
risks are constructed, apprehended and integrated by the concerned 
players. We shall privilege references likely to nourish reflection as to 
communications related matters especially through confronting it with the 
results of a survey5 conducted out in the field.  
In our contribution, we shall, in the first section, address the issue of 
uncertainty in design, which concerns the developed product and its later 
use just as how the design project is pursued. In a second section, we shall 
focus on decision-making and how the various risks that can affect the 
firm and its environment are taken into account. We shall see to what 
extent the ubiquity of uncertainty, affecting the available knowledge and 
the methods for evaluation of phenomena, make learning from the past 
procedures for evaluation and decisions to be implemented a delicate 
issue, while also making communication (internally and externally) a 
difficult matter.  
 
UNCERTAINTY IN TOURISM-ORIENTED DESIGN 
 
By its very nature, design is characterized by uncertainty and this all 
the more so in so far as it is innovative. This uncertainty concerns both 
the product developed and its later use on the one hand and the 
implementation of the design project on the other and can be affected by 
events both inside and outside the firm involved. It is considered to be 
acceptable by the project team as long as it remains within a domain of 
tolerance (domain of performance, margin for contingencies, etc); here 
the notion of risk conflates with the possibility of egress from such a 
situation. 
                                                 
5 We conducted a long-term survey into the communication process in 
how firms in the tourist sector structure their design processes. We 
favored a combinatory methodology (observation, interviews and study of 
documents) to give us a clearer picture of daily practices and better 
understand the representations of the players involved (designers, sales 
people, communication specialists, decision-makers, etc.). 
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Uncertainty as to the tourist product developed  
 
A product is the response to a demand or expectation (that can be 
more or less clearly formulated). This need
6
 of the end user may not or 
may no longer correspond to the designers’ apperception of it on which 
product development is based. Indeed, the expression of a need is always 
subjective, above all when it is not directly formulated by the dictator of 
choice but just by an intermediate player (the travel agency, for example) 
reckoning on a clear intention to buy (interpreted in turn by the marketing 
or sales department). Between the decision to design and that to make the 
product available, the need can change and make the sales proposal 
obsolete, either due to a variation in the expectations of the market 
(change in the environment, fashion effect, emergence of new standards 
as with that relating to sustainable tourism, etc..), or due to the arrival of 
more effective competing products.  
The product’s ability to respond to the need constituted the first 
element of uncertainty encountered by the designers questioned. This can 
relate to functionalities and performances that are not commensurate with 
those expected in the planned conditions for use (including operational 
characteristics such as reliability and availability of hotel 
accommodation), damage to the environment, considered to be 
unacceptable (pollution, meteorological disturbance, etc.) caused by the 
use or malfunctions in the tourist-oriented product, or risks relating to the 
safety or security of people or goods. Failure to achieve the expected 
performances can lead to problems anticipating phenomena that escape 
prediction (tsunami, economic crisis, etc.) or those that are known but 
neglected due to reasons related to confining uncertainty within 
acceptable costs (as with insurance expenses).  
This possible deviation between the tourist-oriented product and 
customer expectations
7 can also be due to unpredictable difficulties when 
it comes to implementation (as with national strikes as with those seen in 
Greece in December 2008) or the inadequate nature of validation 
procedures for results as compared with objectives (inadequate guarantees 
                                                 
6 The term “need” as used here refers to an implicit or explicit demand 
from a client or principal to which the design activity attempts to provide 
a response. “Functional analysis of need" has the aim of finding a way of 
expressing that need (standard NF X 50 - 151). 
7 Cf. the debates that took place at the conference “National tourism : at 
the heart of our growth” Paris, 18-19 June 2008. http://www.assises-
tourisme.fr/discours.html 
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from service providers, etc.). And even when all the obstacles have been 
overcome, outside changes, as with the appearance of new standards (cf. 
changes related to development and sustainable tourism) or new 
regulations that can lead to failure of certain suppliers, service providers 
or subcontractors, make some equipment obsolete (swimming pool, tennis 
court, hotels, etc.), and finally prevent fulfilment of the strategy.  
The perceived difficulties are also related to an underestimation of 
the complexity and innovative character of the technologies implemented 
(information and communication technologies not effectively controlled 
for example). According to the players questioned, these are largely 
caused by a “lack of competence”, zeal for “perfectionism” or “lack of 
alternative solutions”. They can also be related to management problems 
due to a chronic lack of personnel, an element which leads to take into 
consideration the links between uncertainty and work on a daily basis. 
 
Uncertainty during project roll-out 
 
Beside the tourist product itself, this other type of uncertainty 
generates a certain number difficulties likely to affect forecasts for the 
future. Indeed, random factors in development lead to drifting of costs 
and design and development lead times. While it would be unrealistic to 
attempt here to account for all the possible sources of uncertainty that can 
affect a project, a brief presentation of those most often mentioned during 
our interviews will nevertheless provide a clear illustration of the 
importance of information related aspects in the emergence of a tourist 
product. 
Project management mainly involves organising a process of 
acquisition of knowledge and decision-making while co-ordinating the 
activity of various specialists (Boutinet, 1998). Now, the acquisition of 
knowledge required for the project can be affected by a host of 
malfunctions, including especially patchy knowledge in the field of 
technology watch or capitalisation on know-how, too frequent rotation of 
personnel, an uneven representation of different skills, a dearth or 
conversely an excess of information available, the unreliable nature of 
that information or its non-synthetic nature. In this perspective, the 
quality of information exchanged becomes essential. This depends mainly 
on the “positive attitude” of the players whose behaviour can lead to a 
lack of transparency and mutual trust. Such behaviour patterns range from 
withholding information (seen as a way of holding power) to 
dissimulating errors that may have been committed (whence difficulties 
planning for the future on the basis of what has been learnt from the past), 
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and include the spreading of rumours or too much time spent in meetings. 
The relative performance of communication tools used and the possible 
existence of barriers between the various departments also play a major 
role in the circulation of information, as a number of research works have 
demonstrated (Lepine, 1999). This barrier between departments was 
systematically mentioned by the people we talked to, whatever their level 
in the hierarchy. 
 Furthermore, analysis of the situations by the various players 
concerned sometimes neglects certain aspects of the problems posed or 
remains restricted to the singular point of view of a particular speciality 
without seeking the best trade-off with other sectors. Now, globally 
optimising a tourist product rarely results from a sum of local 
optimisations. This quest for an optimum solution pre-supposes mutual 
understanding between players who are often highly specialised. Thus, to 
design a travel product to a new destination, a strategic player with an 
extensive range of knowledge needs to be appointed to conduct this 
barely perceived “work of articulation” that allows for “the collective 
efforts of the team to finally be greater than the chaotic efforts of the 
scattered fragments of work ” (Strauss, 1992 : 26). But this key person, 
taken to be the manager, is too often assigned that role for reasons 
unrelated to their abilities in coordinating things or acting as a mediator. 
The search for solutions and the corresponding choices can also lead 
to disappointing or even negative results, especially if the number of 
solutions open for consideration is limited ex ante. Now, the first solution 
found is often adopted and, where this is not the case, the optimum 
solution is not systematically taken up. Even if some working methods 
are an attempt to build on multiple criteria allowing a certain rationality to 
be devoted to procedures involving comparison between solutions, the 
approach finally adopted will nevertheless remain largely subjective. 
The decision-making process can itself be affected by multiple 
malfunctions. A number of these were explained to us by the design 
people interviewed, such as stasis due to “weak-willed decision-makers”, 
the absence of delegation, long decision-making circuits or the search for 
a compromise at all costs. Other malfunctions were recounted by the 
decision-makers themselves, as with the lack of consultation, failure to 
respect the decision-making process, conflicts of interest, resorting to 
“power games”, the lack of coordination between departments, etc. The 
consensus is that the decisions themselves suffer from a failure to take all 
their consequences into account, from an inadequate follow-up for actions 
decided on, just as “a low level of commitment from general 
management”. These difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that, often, 
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there is no structure for arbitration to settle conflicts, and choices are not 
covered by a validation procedure that may bring them into question 
(discussions, confrontations, comparisons, counter-evaluation, etc.). Our 
interviewees told us that such problems have become even more critical 
over the last few months. Is this an effect of the current economic crisis 
that has devastated leisure tourism? 
In this context, tourism design largely reflects that “paradoxical 
management” described by Boutinet in his works on project structures 
(1990). It also tends to reconcile theory and practice, with individual logic 
and collective logic, but also innovation and the rush to ensure lead-times 
are respected while also limiting, in so far as it is possible, the 
consumption of resources. Above all, it involves managing uncertainty, so 
that it will remain within a range of acceptable tolerance for the firm, its 
customers and its environment. Furthermore, this strategic activity 
concerns above all risk and how it is to be brought under control. The 
following paragraphs will deal with this issue, with a focus on the role of 
communication in decision-making.  
 
COMMUNICATION AND DECISION 
 
Risks of a technical, economic, human, social, organisational or even 
communicational nature can affect the firm and its environment. The 
tourism organization seeks to hedge against this through a rational and 
sustained approach to identify risks and bring them under control. This 
method addresses the main issue of safety, reliability and availability of 
the product during its design and use, right through to its being 
relinquished
8
. As the risks also relate to budget overspends and associated 
shifts in scheduling, the methods used are mainly based on feedback and 
the use of generic risk check lists (default of a service provider, a partner 
not having the necessary authorizations, etc.). 
But “The difficulties of transferring knowledge within the firm have 
been sighted both in theory and in practice” (Szulanski, 2003 and 
Rolland, Stanley, Perrin, 2007, 553). Moreover, communication on these 
risks is a delicate issue and corporate communication itself constitutes a 
risk for the organization.  
  
 
                                                 
8 Cf. the “Principle of precaution” and injunctions related to sustainable 
development. 
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Perception and decision 
 
The technically oriented approach based on feedback (involving 
boosting the amount of information stored) is often privileged in tourism 
organisations as it appears relatively simple and gives a certain illusion of 
comprehensiveness. But how to ensure that such information is both 
relevant and available?  
The formalization of various forms of knowledge in an appropriate 
language constitutes the essential condition for the success of any attempt 
to capitalize on and profit from prior experience. Now, a large number of 
players, whose levels of motivation may vary, are concerned by the chain 
of acquisition, capitalization and profiting from experience, that requires 
from everyone a minimum of effort (entering data, formulation, indexing 
documents, etc.) or even changes in habits (appropriation, consultation, 
taking such aspects into account in action, etc).  
 Some of them can prove to be all the less inclined to bring up their 
experience in the matter in so far as such information relating to crises, 
incidents or even accidents in the past brings back unhappy memories. In 
addition, the ex post facto perception of such unfortunate events 
fluctuates according to the period (cf. current debates as to the role of 
tourism in exhausting natural resources or its effects on local populations, 
for example), the specific cultural features of the players concerned, and 
their possible role at that particular time. 
What is more, the perception of risk is by nature subjective and often 
not commensurate with its true scale. It depends on the knowledge, fears 
and habits of all concerned or the possible sense of a challenge that risk-
taking represents for the individual. Thus, car drivers would seem to be 
unmoved by the many daily accidents caused by their usual means of 
transport whereas they are shocked by coach, train or plane accidents, 
however safer these latter are statistically. The perception of danger can 
arouse irrational fears and anxieties (Theys, 1991; Peretti-Watel, 2000; 
Zografos and Deffner, 2009), especially when it comes to events that are 
often amplified by the media effect or, conversely, the sense of thrill for 
the consequent risks (those induced by speed or the practice of sports in 
extreme conditions, for example). This perception of risk is all the more 
subjective in so far as the said risk combines two very different 
dimensions, the probability of the event’s occurrences and its seriousness. 
Now, frequent incidents with little serious effect are sometimes less well 
tolerated (cf. bad weather causing delays or disruption to public services 
as occurred in France in January 2008) than much more serious though 
exceptional accidents. This perception is culturally defined and depends 
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on social position as well as individuals’ systems of values. The works of 
Douglas and Calvez (1990) have explained, for example, some of the 
difficulties encountered by AIDS prevention campaigns, by the beliefs 
and ways of thinking of the groups targeted (representations of health, 
sickness and sexuality, etc.).  
Thus, as a result of the sometimes considerable gap between the 
perception of risk and its true scale, the real issue for the organization 
may well be more in correctly managing the perception of risk than the 
risk itself; with the risk only becoming “acceptable” if, in a certain way, it 
has been “accepted” (Godard, 1999). Unfortunately, few studies address 
the perception of risk in the tourist industry. However, recent studies on 
other fields of activity illustrate this difficulty. Here we could cite the 
context of the recent decision taken in Sweden: “Medical studies have 
shown that long-lasting exposure to electromagnetic fields generated by 
high voltage power lines very slightly increased the risk of leukemia 
observed in children. Although these results are subject to debate, it has 
been decided to bury these lines in the suburbs of Stockholm in order to 
eliminate this possible cause of illness. The cost of burying the lines has 
been estimated to come to 750 million US dollars per case of leukemia 
avoided. Compared with this, the risks related to smoking are well known 
and the effect of an anti-smoking campaign is reckoned to come to less 
than 500 dollars per case of cancer avoided.” (Sjöberg, 2001: 117).   
Thus, prevention policies are sometimes relatively ineffective as 
compared with the means implemented. (Duclos, 1996; Lascoumes, 1996; 
Azim, 2010). Let us take another example. In 1988, the principles for 
sustainable tourism were decided on by the WTO, defining it as a way of 
managing “all the resources allowing economic, aesthetic and social 
needs to be satisfied, and to preserve cultural integrity, ecosystems, 
biodiversity and life sustaining systems”. This form of tourism, that aims 
to take populations into account, fosters cultural diversity, seeks to 
support the local economy, and defends the idea that tourism is for all. 
Individuals, organizations and governments have devoted considerable 
efforts to identify the components of sustainable tourism and instigate 
methods to set up and evaluate such components over the last decade. But 
the actual results are meager; setting up this type of tourism remains an 
awkward matter often coming into conflict with the wishes of the local 
players or with the desires of organizations and governments. 
Another example is the determination to rapidly publicize the results 
of a policy to tackle oil slick problems led by the authorities keen to again 
welcome tourists where they used highly toxic dispersants that are more 
harmful to the environment than hydrocarbons. The current behavior of 
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the politicians when it comes to safety problems contrasts starkly with a 
certain reluctance or even failure to react that was observed in the past 
(Beck, 1993). But beside the determination to show an ability to ensure 
control over any type of situation, the behavior of decision-makers can 
also be explained by the overriding concern not to worry people to no 
purpose (Roqueplo, 1997; Duclos, 1996). “For a long time, a sense of 
balance prevailed: those able to make decisions benefited from a real 
credit rating in the view of other social groups. But, in modern society, 
the confidence granted to “experts cum decision-makers” has gradually 
been undermined.” (Hyard, 2000: 189).  
Moreover, the image of scientific experts in France has been sullied 
by a series of affairs relating to public health (contaminated donor blood, 
asbestos, the Chernobyl contamination in France wrongly denied, 
management of climatic catastrophes, etc.) and it has now become 
extremely awkward to communicate around the theme of risk. “However, 
it is not so much a reflex based on phobia and the ritualizing of ancestral 
fears that is involved, but rather everything that citizenship implies in 
terms of intervention, delegation and, division of political work that is 
now brought into question faced with the complexity of the technological 
world and decision-making processes. ” (Duclos, 1996: 336).  
The underlying expertise (Trepos, 1996) also has its limits that are all 
the more readily reached in so far as the problems involved are of a 
complex nature. Now, the generally maintained illusion of being capable 
of effectively handling all possible risks fosters the emergence of an 
increasing complexity of products. This explains why greater knowledge 
can paradoxically lead to greater system vulnerability (Ewald, 1996) as 
with ABS braking that while it allows drivers to get in dangerously close 
to the theoretical limits of mechanics, with a feeling of complete 
confidence, has the perverse effect of statistically increasing the number 
and seriousness of car accidents. What then are the limits not to be 
exceeded in designing systems for tourism? On this question N. Luhmann 
(1991) evokes the concept of “riskiness” that tends to increase with 
knowledge. Maintaining the illusion that risks can be fully eliminated 
proves to be the source of many misunderstandings since zero risk is 
inexistent.  
Furthermore, to be able to accept a risk, the individuals still need to 
have the minimum amount of knowledge to understand the situations and 
the alternatives that can be considered for a real dialogue to emerge 
between the experts, the decision-makers (including the State) and 
citizens, either directly or through their associations (Renn, 2001). This 
shared culture of risk would require a major effort to train and explain 
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matters simply and this represents a real communication issue. For it 
concerns the organization not just of relations with the environment but 
also, and above all, in internal operation, as uncertainty (and how it is 
managed) constitutes the main element in analysis and decision within 
design project structures. This involves multiple exchanges between the 
various players in the firm for a common understanding of the problems 
encountered, and that we shall attempt to understand. But can this shared 
culture of risk be contemplated when it comes to a tourist oriented 
product whose image is tied up with the idea of holidays, sunshine, rest 
and generally being cosseted? 
 
On the difficulty of handling risks  
 
Identification and evaluation of risk in the firm comes under the 
competence of assessors or experts, while decision-making remains the 
manager’s prerogative. But are the assessors always “reliable” and do 
they know how to communicate the issues and results of their expertise to 
the decision-maker? How does the latter grasp the data from risk analyses 
as a decision-making aid, knowing that due to the necessarily limited 
financial resources available, only risks considered to be really 
unacceptable can be effectively addressed?  
Even assuming that all risks have been identified by the assessors, 
their evaluation in terms of seriousness and probability is often a delicate 
matter. Indeed, the events corresponding to the most critical risks are 
generally infrequent and rarely lead to statistically representative data. 
Furthermore, such data, when they exist, are to be handled with care and 
discernment (Villemeur, 1988) as they are likely to lead to an 
“informational binge” (Dubois, 1999; Dodds and Butler, 2010). But does 
this mean we should push aside any penchant for quantification? Figures 
often have a pernicious effect, above all when they are based on statistics 
that need to be considered with some precaution, and can often either 
reassure or give rise to excessive worry. But the ’absence of 
quantification can be more dangerous still by leading to an unbalanced 
distribution of effort. Thus, quantitative evaluation of risks is the 
approach most often used to compare choices or establish a ranking of 
decisions. 
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In addition, the firm is also led to communicate on risk beyond the 
confine of its own structure. Recent legislation
9
 imposes on organizations 
obligations relating to safety, including especially that of informing the 
authorities and the public (Viney, 2000; Libaert, 2006). Firms are then 
confronted by various dilemmas: How to  communicate? How far to go in 
explaining things? Can information backed up by weighty documentation 
on uncertainties be disseminated without fear of having a perversely 
negative effect? 
The transparency of an organization can be defined as the quality 
that makes its operation decipherable and comprehensible for individuals 
outside it. This assumes a variety of facets including traceability that 
allows changes in a product to be monitored or its constituent parts to be 
followed from their origin. This traceability of products is an essential 
element, where a problem arises, in identifying suspect products or 
batches or in evaluating their effects. The recent crisis relating to the 
outbreak of foot and mouth disease showed, for example, the disastrous 
effects of a lack of traceability in the propagation of diseases, especially 
in Great Britain.  
Transparency also involves other aspects answering to new social 
demands, in particular respect for a certain ethical code. This concerns for 
example working conditions in organizations, respect for human rights 
(Burma) or the preservation of the environment. It can lead to a 
significant degradation in the firm’s image, or even to its products being 
boycotted where failings are clearly seen. Thus, firms were forced to quit 
South Africa at the time of apartheid and others were long-lastingly 
affected by accidental pollution, as with Union Carbide after the Bhopal 
disaster.  
Firms are also clearly divested of the right to refuse this obligation to 
provide information in so far as they have availed themselves of the 
opportunity to speak out, firstly through advertizing for their products, 
then within the scope of institutional publicity laying claim to certain 
values (Libaert, 2006). Some organizations however adopt a minimal 
notion of transparency (cf. the low number of activity reports taking up 
precisely the issue of sustainable tourism) that involves respecting the 
straightforward provision of information to the “public“. This reduced 
                                                 
9In France, these requirements are covered by legislation brought in by 
Barnier under law No. 95-101 of 2 February 1995 relating to reinforced 
protection of the environment, Bachelot No. 2003-699 of 30 July 2003 
relating to technological and natural risks and reparation for damages, and 
the various specific regulations relating to the sector concerned. 
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interpretation of transparency can be understood as a deliberate strategy to 
hide certain items of information (Beck U., 1993) or even to do nothing 
about matters (cf. corporate social responsibility or CSR, that is not 
covered in the activity reports of the main tourist businesses), and thus 
seriously impairs the emergence of relations of mutual confidence.  
Conversely, a more developed conception of transparency may 
involve providing the targeted sections of the public and the consumers 
concerned all the elements for appreciation liable to allow them to forge 
their own opinions, as with qualitative and quantitative indicators, 
environmental impact studies, const-benefit analyses, etc. (Libaert, 2006). 
But this form of transparency is not without its drawbacks. Indeed, the 
recipients do not always have the ability to weigh up the elements of 
’information provided and, where the competition is keen, it can seek to 
seek to use such information to its advantage to practice industrial 
espionage or arouse people’s suspicions (Viney, 2000). This is all the 
truer in so far as the innovative design of a tourist product is relatively 
easy to copy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Nowadays, in a knowledge-based economy, innovation is considered 
to be indispensable for differentiation. This innovation is generally 
implemented within a design team covering various structures and 
professions within and outside the organization. The communicational 
aspect appears essential to the effective roll-out of the project, both in 
terms of acquisition and sharing of knowledge, emergence of new ideas 
and coordination of the activities of all those involved.  
In parallel, tourism organizations are becoming ever more complex, 
both as far as their products are concerned and in the way they operate, 
above all when innovation leads it to the limits of knowledge. This 
complexity increases uncertainty and engenders new risks, further 
exacerbated by a major economic crisis. In addition, the business needs to 
implement continuous evaluation processes to offer satisfactory tourist 
products, ensure the availability of services rendered and the safety and 
security of people and property, in a legislative context that is ever more 
restrictive. It also seeks to ensure planning for the future from feedback 
on previous activity to learn from the past.  But each project is specific 
and previously acquired experience can rarely be applied directly to the 
next project: products evolve, technologies and partners change, customer 
expectations fluctuate, and operating conditions vary. 
Arlette Bouzon & Joëlle Devillard 
 
 66 
This management in uncertainty proves to be all the more delicate a 
matter for the designers of tourism products in so far as risk is an 
eminently subjective notion that aggregates dimensions that are 
themselves difficult to evaluate (cf. management of the current crisis). 
Furthermore, the diversified perception of the players involved skews 
action and scrambles communication, both in-house between the 
designers and decision-makers, and outside the firm when it attempts to 
explain and justify uncertainty to its customers, partners and neighbors. 
Management of uncertainty on the one hand and communication on the 
other prove to be inseparable.  
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